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The present paper explores the extent to which new joint General Budget Support (GBS) 
systems have been able to overcome the problems of aid dependency and negative fiscal 
incentives that can potentially result from high levels of on-budget aid. As approximately 90 
percent of new joint GBS goes to sub-Saharan Africa, this analysis, which covers the period 
from 2000 to 2008, evaluates data from 37 sub-Saharan developing countries. According to 
fixed effect and system GMM  estimations,  joint  GBS  assistance  –  although highly 
discretionary – does not undermine recipients’ revenue mobilization efforts. Indeed, on the 
contrary, while aid in general has no measurable impact on recipients’ revenue performance, 
joint GBS programs are associated with higher revenue mobilization. This suggests that on-
budget aid delivered under well-targeted conditionality successfully mitigates adverse fiscal 
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1.  Introduction 
The question of whether or under which circumstances development assistance discourages 
revenue mobilization efforts by recipient countries has been the subject of extensive debate in 
academia and among development practitioners for many years (e.g. Heller, 1975; Devarajan 
and Swaroop, 1998; McGillvray and Morrissey, 2000, McGillvray and Morrissey 2004; Teera 
and Hudson, 2004). A frequently raised concern is that development aid, particularly when 
delivered through highly discretionary arrangements, provides recipient governments, whose 
policymakers naturally aim at minimizing political cost, with a “free lunch” substitute for 
domestic revenue  collection,  thus  increasing  aid dependency. Recent empirical research 
suggests that high levels of development aid, particularly if provided in the form of grants, 
are, indeed, associated with lower revenue efforts and a higher degree of aid dependency 
(Gupta et al., 2004; Gupta, 2007; Clist and Morrissey, 2011).  
However, new assistance and partnership strategies, based on national ownership and self-
responsibility  have  emerged  in response to the legitimacy crisis of the 1990s and  to  the 
growing consensus that development assistance had been largely ineffective – i.e. ill-targeted, 
poorly managed and highly fragmentary, and, in many cases, lacking the imperative buy-in 
from recipients  (Stiglitz, 1998; Van de Walle, 1999; Menocal and Mulley, 2006).  As a 
consequence, the way in which development assistance is delivered has changed considerably 
since  the beginning of the new millennium  (Mosely and Marion, 2000;  Koeberle and 
Stavreski, 2006; Knoll, 2008).  At  a  series of high-level fora,  donors committed to 
significantly scale up aid and to adopt better coordinated intervention strategies. They also 
resolved to  shift away  from financing geographically specific  projects,  which  often  have 
limited and unsustainable impacts, and to focus more on assisting  countries with good 
governance and policy records.
3
As joint GBS financing is a relatively recent modality, an empirical assessment of its revenue 
mobilization impacts has yet to be undertaken. To address this gap in the research, the present 
paper, applying a straight forward approach to model recipients’ fiscal responses to budget 
 To meet donor commitments of scaled-up and more effective 
aid, new  policy approaches, such as harmonized  on-budget  assistance  by bilateral  and 
multilateral agencies, referred to as joint General Budget Support (GBS), have been adopted 
in a number of Low and Lower Middle Income Countries (LICs and LMICs), particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  Joint GBS modalities  serve as policy-based modalities of aid 
delivery whose purpose is to provide recipients with significant discretionary resources for 
implementing domestically developed and owned poverty reduction strategies. To sustainably 
enhance  recipients’  fiscal space, conditionality  of  joint GBS  focuses,  to a large extent, 
explicitly  on  Public  Financial  Management  (PFM)  reforms, comprising both revenue 
mobilization and expenditure management. 
                                                 
 
3   These comprise the 2002 UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey (UN, 2002) and the High Level 
Fora on Aid Effectiveness in Rome (OECD, 2003), Paris, and Accra (OECD, 2008) held in 2003, 2005, and 2008 
respectively.  3 
 
aid,  explores the extent to which new GBS  programs  have  been able to overcome the 
conundrum whereby high levels of on-budget aid may potentially result in negative fiscal 
incentives.  
The analysis covers the period from 2000 to 2008 and comprises 37 SSA LICs and LMICs.
4
The paper proceeds as follows: After  providing  an overview on the context and 
implementation procedures of GBS delivery in Section 2, Section 3 reviews the literature on 
fiscal revenue  mobilization in developing countries,  placing a  particular focus on recent 
empirical findings. Sections 4 and 5 present the modelling strategy and specify the data used 
in the subsequent analysis. After outlining the estimation techniques employed to adequately 
control for fiscal revenue responses to GBS financing,  Section 6 presents and interprets 
findings for the fixed effects and dynamic specifications. Section 7 concludes with a summary 
and final assessment.  
 
According to the empirical results using fixed effect and dynamic panel estimations, joint on-
budget assistance financing – although highly discretionary – does not undermine recipients’ 
revenue mobilization efforts. On the contrary, while aid in general has no measurable impact 
on recipients’ revenue performance, GBS programs are found to be associated with higher 
revenue mobilization. This suggests that on-budget aid, when  coupled with well-targeted 
conditionality, intensive policy dialogue,  and  embedded  technical assistance,  successfully 
mitigates adverse resource mobilization incentives and enhances fiscal space. 
 
2.  Expansion of joint GBS  
Traditional budget support, as provided until the late 1990s under the structural adjustment 
programs of the World Bank and IMF, was conceived primarily for the short-term, stand-
alone redress of macroeconomic and fiscal policy imbalances (Phillips, 2009) and usually 
drew on a set of predefined Washington-formulated conditionality (Rodrik, 2006). The new 
approach to GBS financing, which has evolved since the beginning of the new Millennium, 
serves instead as a common platform for bi- and multilateral medium-to-long-term policy-
based lending operations
5 and aims at supporting a nationally owned development strategy, as 
laid out in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). While the composition of bi- and 
multilateral GBS donor groups varies from country to country, a group of leading donors has 
emerged over time, including the World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank (AfDB), 
European Commission (EC), and several bilateral agencies.
6
                                                 
 
4   For a list of countries included see Appendix I. 
  
5   That is, concessional loans or grants with disbursement conditional upon the implementation of a policy menu. 
6   World Bank budget support to SSA recipients is generally provided under Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits (PRSC) at 
concessional IDA terms (World Bank, 2010). The IMF concessional lending window in support of the PRS has since 
1999 been the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). In January 2010 the PRGF has been formally replaced by 
the Extended Credit Facility (Adam and Bevan, 2001; IMF 2009; IMF, 2011a). AfDB’s budget support aid to its regional 
member countries is delivered through its concessional lending arm, the African Development Fund (ADF). The EC 
provides budget support grants to SSA recipients from the European Development Fund (EC, 2007). The most important 4 
 
The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD/DAC) defines General Budget 
Support as an aid modality in which foreign funds from various official donors are transferred 
to the recipient’s  treasury  and are managed and spent according to national budgetary 
regulations and priorities (OECD, 2005a; OECD, 2006). In addition to the use of recipients’ 
allocation, procurement, and auditing systems (which are referred to in the following as PFM 
systems), the key characteristic of joint GBS, as outlined by Koeberle and Stavreski (2006), is 
the provision of support at regular intervals (ideally, synchronized with recipients’ budget 
cycle)  with  conditionality  particularly  focussing  on  public sector reform,  institution and 
capacity building, and the strengthening of budgetary as well as other PFM processes.  
Joint GBS is generally provided within a framework of institutionalized continuous policy 
dialogue between GBS donors and recipients. Policy dialogue  serves as  a  platform  for 
agreement on specific policy and reform measures directly related to the PRSP, to assess their 
implementation and decide on the release of funds to the recipient’s treasury.  
With donors’ commitments to significantly scale up aid, budget support has become– when 
conditions on the ground are considered satisfactory – the modality of choice for various 
reasons:  
First, with on-budget  aid delivery untied  and fully fungible, monies can be allocated 
according to national priorities – a significant element of the concept of country ownership. 
Second, compared to other forms of aid delivery, donor harmonization is easy to achieve, as 
co-ordination is limited to strategic targets and conditionality, reviewing, monitoring, and 
disbursement procedures. Donors can thus align with a set of conditionality negotiated with 
the recipient government, while joint allocation decisions or earmarking are obsolete. Third, 
GBS, in its capacity as a fast disbursing instrument, canalizes disbursement pressures and 
provides donors with significant leverage and  a degree of control in the policy dialogue, 
which is an important factor for fiduciary risk mitigation.  
Against this backdrop, GBS financing has gained increasing prominence over the last ten 
years, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. According to OECD/DAC data maintained by the 
creditor reporting system (CRS), approximately 90 percent of joint GBS is allocated to Africa 
south of the Sahara.
7
Since the gradual introduction of joint GBS funding, a group of 14 African countries has 
benefited from the modality.
 
8
                                                                                                                                                    
 
bilateral GBS donors to SSA recipients, providing either grants or concessional loans are Canada, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK (OECD/DAC CRS, micro data for purpose code 51010).  
 Drawing on GBS disbursement data gathered by the author, the 
7   OECD/DAC data can only be used as proxy for joint GBS activity as the respective CRS budget support purpose code 
(51010) only reports general budget support operations by donors irrespectively of the degree of whether GBS is 
provided jointly with  harmonized  conditionality and disbursement procedures  (see below).  The  methodology for 
collection of GBS data used in the subsequent empirical analysis is described in section 4. Data sources are provided in 
Appendix III. 
8   Sierra Leone has been excluded from the sample as it does not represent a classical joint GBS operation but has been 
designed as a medium-term post-conflict and state building assistance program (Lawson, 2007). 5 
 
average share of joint GBS operations in overall Official Development Assistance (ODA) has, 
as shown in Table 1,  reached  significant  levels,  with  a fairly stable average  level of 
approximately 20 percent for the time period from 2005 to 2008. With such high shares of aid 
provided in the form of joint on-budget funding, GBS significantly expands recipients’ fiscal 
space, increasing available resources by between 16  and  25  percent  of domestic revenue 
(Table 1).  
Table 1: GBS share in total ODA (percent)/ 
Contribution to total domestic revenue excl. grants (percent) 
Year  Start of 
Operation 
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Benin  2004  GBS /total ODA              15.7  26.5  17.8  29.3  13.0 
GBS /total revenue              8.9  13.1  8.4  12.2  6.7 
Burkina Faso  2001 
GBS /total ODA     16.4  26.9  22.3  23.2  27.7  25.1  29.1  33.1 
GBS /total revenue     22.3  34.4  22.6  22.9  28.2  29.3  30.2  30.6 
Cape Verde  2005  GBS /total ODA                 18.6  9.7  21.5  13.6 
GBS /total revenue                 11.2  4.1  8.6  5.7 
Ghana  2003  GBS /total ODA           33.9  25.2  26.3  38.7  25.3  30.5 
GBS /total revenue           21.7  16.8  11.8  16.8  7.6  8.8 
Madagascar  2004 
GBS /total ODA              16.1  13.4  18.4  13.3  29.1 
GBS /total revenue              38.5  22.1  21.6  13.6  21.7 
Malawi  2000  GBS /total ODA  15.0  11.8  0.0  4.5  13.0  24.8  13.2  15.0  26.3 
GBS /total revenue  20.9  15.3  0.0  4.1  10.0  20.3  12.0  16.1  27.3 
Mali  2002  GBS /total ODA        10.5  18.4  13.7  16.1  22.5  11.2  18.4 
GBS /total revenue        10.7  14.4  9.4  11.8  19.1  9.6  13.0 
Mozambique  2000 
GBS /total ODA  17.5  17.6  10.5  20.3  18.3  23.9  22.9  23.5  27.9 
GBS /total revenue  28.3  31.4  41.5  35.4  24.1  28.4  26.1  22.0  23.1 
Niger  2001  GBS /total ODA     4.2  21.2  15.4  13.7  12.4  12.3  13.7  9.0 
GBS /total revenue     5.9  28.0  26.5  23.9  18.0  13.6  12.8  6.6 
Rwanda  2002  GBS /total ODA        18.2  19.8  25.7  32.7  18.2  30.7  21.7 
GBS /total revenue        33.0  27.6  46.0  52.4  30.5  51.6  30.4 
Senegal  2004 
GBS /total ODA              5.5  8.1  7.2  6.5  23.8 
GBS /total revenue              4.0  3.3  3.2  2.4  9.8 
Tanzania  2001  GBS /total ODA     4.0  15.1  27.9  25.0  39.5  32.8  29.5  28.7 
GBS /total revenue     4.5  16.2  36.7  28.7  33.2  29.3  31.0  19.9 
Uganda  2001  GBS /total ODA     19.4  13.0  29.3  22.8  21.6  23.4  13.9  15.9 
GBS /total revenue     25.9  13.3  40.2  30.0  23.8  28.9  15.8  13.8 
Zambia  2004 
GBS /total ODA              29.4  9.3  10.2  19.7  21.6 
GBS /total revenue              33.9  8.5  8.0  9.8  8.6 
Unweighted 
Average    
GBS/total ODA  16.2  12.2  15.0  21.5  17.7  20.2  18.8  18.6  21.4 
Unweighted 
Average    
GBS /total revenue  24.6  17.5  23.8  25.2  21.2  19.6  17.6  16.8  15.7 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2011, series codes DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS (ODA in current USD), 
GC.REV.XGRT.GD.ZS (Central Government Revenue as share in GDP), and GBS disbursement data gathered by the 
author (see Appendix I). 
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As joint GBS has become the modality of choice for donors to deliver on their commitments 
to scale up and harmonize the provision of aid, the question becomes highly relevant whether 
GBS, as unearned free-lunch income, negatively impacts domestic revenue mobilization. To 
answer this question, the following sections will explore the extent to which joint GBS, along 
with structural determinates, impacts recipients’ revenue-raising performance.  
 
 
3.  Determinants of Revenue Mobilization Efforts in Developing Countries 
Harnessing increasingly advanced econometric tools, a series of recent empirical research 
studies has identified and validated a set of structural determinates of revenue mobilization in 
developing countries. According to the seminal analysis by Tanzi (1992), which has been 
used as the point of departure for most subsequent studies, developing countries’ revenue 
mobilization efforts, proxied by the share of tax revenue in GDP, to a significant extent 
depend on i) the structural composition of value added, ii) per capita income, iii) the volume 
of trade, and iv) the stock of public debt.  
i)  The composition of GDP, in particular the share of agricultural value added in aggregate 
output, is a salient factor affecting the tax base (Tanzi, 1992). As Teera and Hudson 
(2004) note, this is due to demand as well as supply effects. Economies with a high share 
of agricultural output tend to have a significantly smaller demand for publically provided 
goods and services. At the same time, the sector’s ability to contribute to the financing of 
government activities and  public  services is,  in  the case of developing countries 
generally, limited by its subsistence and small-scale informal character (Stotsky et al., 
1997; Teera and Hudson, 2004). Industrial production and services, on the other hand, 
generally require more publically produced goods as intermediate inputs for production. 
Consequently, these sectors are organized in more formal and easier-to-tax structures 
(Teera and Hudson, 2004). Nevertheless, to avoid collinearity problems in econometric 
analysis, it is recommended to control for the share of agriculture in GDP only, which has 
been identified by previous research as having the most explanatory power (see Table 2). 
ii)  Per capita income (GNI per capita) proxies the level of socio-economic development and 
serves as an index of surplus income available for taxation (Teera and Hudson, 2004). 
Furthermore, it is assumed that higher degrees of economic development entail higher 
levels of institutional capacity to levy and collect revenue (Chelliah, 1971). 
iii)  Customs and other trade related excises, levies and taxes – the extent of which primarily 
primarily depends on the overall volume of trade – have been a major source of revenue 
in developing countries  (albeit with declining volumes after the Uruguay Round). 
Compared to income and value added taxes, trade related revenue is easy to collect, as 
administrative structures required for effective collection and enforcement are relatively 
small. Furthermore, trade operates within the formal economy, providing a significant 
base for various taxes, such as value added or general sales taxes (Tanzi, 1992). The 7 
 
intensity of trade is generally measured by the sum of exports and imports as share in 
GDP.  
iv)  Accumulation of public and publically guaranteed debt (PPGD)  entails  recurrent 
government expenditure in the form of interest payments, which can either be financed 
through additional net borrowing or increased revenue mobilization. Studies covering 
longer and more distant time periods find empirical evidence for a substantive effect of 
PPGD on tax revenue mobilization  (Tanzi, 1992; Gupta et al., 2004).
9
While these factors represent a rather parsimonious baseline set, more recent studies also 
control for other potential factors, such as the quality of governance (Gupta, 2007) or the 
assumed size of the informal economy (Teera and Hudson, 2004). However, while Gupta 
(2007) tests specifications with various Intra Country Risk Guide governance indicators 
(ICRG) such as political stability, law and order, government stability, and corruption – all of 
which would be expected to affect revenue mobilization efforts – only the perceived level of 
corruption appears to be moderately significant in some specifications.
  More recent 
research, however, has failed to detect a significant and meaningful positive relation, a 
point that will be considered in Section 6.  
10 Teera and Hudson’s 
(2004) informal economy indicator is significant and meaningful, but counter-intuitively 
suggests that in the case of LICs, revenue mobilization positively depends on the size of the 
shadow economy.
11
With the debate on the general effectiveness of aid, the focus has, however, shifted from 
determining and confirming principal factors for  the  revenue mobilization capacity of 
developing countries to identifying the effect of aid on domestic revenue collection (Gupta et 
al., 2004; Teera and Hudson, 2004, Gupta, 2007; Clist and Morrissey, 2011). The current 
predominate view taken by academia is that a recipient’s fiscal response depends on whether 
aid comes in the form of grants or concessional loans (Gupta et al. 2004; Clist and Morrissey, 
2011). While grants represent mere windfalls and free-lunch substitutes for politically costly 
revenue mobilization, it is assumed that concessional loans, due to the intrinsic repayment 
motive, tend to encourage spending decisions that yield positive socio-economic net benefits 
that, in turn, enable recipients to service and redeem outstanding concessional debt (Gupta et 
al., 2004; Bräutigam, 2000). The validity of this argument will be reviewed in the subsequent 
section. 
  
                                                 
 
9   The here cited studies use total external debt as proxy for PPGD as at this point in time consistent PPGD data was 
unavailable. 
10   Measures of perceived corruption generally aggregate the perceived level of petty corruption and the perceived level of 
heavy embezzlement and the willful causing of loss to the state.  
11   An overview on explanatory variables, the time period covered, and the applied estimation technique used by previous 
studies is provided in Table 2. 8 
 
Table 2: Significant varialbes for domestic revenue mobilization identified by previous 
empirical research 
Authors  Time period and 
sample 
Significant explanatory variables for government 




1973 – 1981,  
8 SSA countries 
 Agricultural value added as share in GDP (–) 
 Trade openness (Imports + Exports)/GDP (+) 
 Autoregressive model 
controlling for AR(1) 
Tanzi  
(1992) 




 Per capita income (+) 
 Agricultural value added as share in GDP (–) 
 Imports as share in GDP (+) 
 External debt stock as share in GDP (+) 
 Cross-section OLS 
Stotsky et al. 
(1997) 
1990 – 1995 
43 SSA countries  
 Per capita income (+) 
 Agricultural value added as share in GDP (–) 
 Exports as share in GDP (+) 
 Mining as share in GDP (–) 
 One error component FE 
model 
 One error component RE 
model 
Teera et al. 
(2004) 
1975 – 1998 
40 LICs* 
 Agricultural value added as share in GDP (–) 
 Trade openness (Imports + Exports)/GDP (+) 
 Population density (+) 
 External debt stock as share in GDP (+) 
 Proxy for scale of non-taxed informal shadow 
economy (+) 
 Log one error component 
FE model with time trend 
Gupta, S. et al. 
(2004) 
1970 – 2000 
107 Developing 
Countries,  
 Agricultural value added as share in GDP (–) 
 Industry value added as share in GDP (+) 
 Trade openness (Imports + Exports)/GDP (+) 
 Per capita income (+) 
 ODA loans as share in GDP (+) 
 (ODA loans as share in GDP)
2 (–) 
 ODA grants as share in GDP (–) 
 (ODA grants as share in GDP)
2 (+) 
 ODA as share in GDP (–) 
 (ODA as share in GDP)
2  (+) 
 Semi-log (regressors) one 
error component FE model 
 Semi-log (regressors) one 





1980 – 2004 
50 LICs* 
 GDP per capita (+) 
 Agricultural value added as share in GDP (–) 
 Imports as share in GDP (+) 
 ODA as share in GDP (–) 
 ICRG Corruption Index (–) 
 Tax revenue from goods and services as share in 
total revenue (+) 
 Tax revenue from income, profits, and capital gains 
as share in total revenue (+) 
 One error component FE 
model  






 ODA loans as share in GDP (+) 
 (ODA loans as share in GDP)
2 (–) 
 ODA grants as share in GDP (–) 
 (ODA grants as share in GDP)
2 (+) 
 Agricultural value added as share in GDP (–) 
 Industry value added as share in GDP (+) 
 Imports as share in GDP (+) 
 Exports as share in GDP (–) 
 One error component FE 
with and without IV 
(lagged aid, unbalanced 
panel) 
 First differences 
(unbalanced panel) 
*   This refers to sub-sample results. As the present paper focuses on SSA LICs, estimation results for LIC sub-samples are 





4.  Modeling Strategy 
The econometric analysis of the present paper follows the fiscal response framework as 
presented  in  Heller (1975) and  Gupta  et al.  (2004).  The recipient’s  government budget 
constraint is given by 
(1)  =++ tttt GRAB , 
with  Gt,  Rt,  At,  and  Bt  denoting  overall government expenditure  including interest on 
outstanding debt,  total domestic revenue, total aid inflow, and net  non-concessional 
borrowing in period t, respectively.
12
(2) 
 The revenue mobilization response to an exogenous 









Hence, if the increase in government expenditure and the downward adjustment in net non-
concessional borrowing do not offset the provision of additional aid resources, such that 







the revenue mobilization response turns negative, with 







This scenario is particularly likely if revenue mobilization is perceived to induce political 
costs that exceed political benefits from expanding expenditure and/or reducing non-
concessional lending.  
However, while  previous empirical studies  have  explicitly or implicitly drawn  on this 
response framework, only Heller (1975) and Gupta et al. (2004) point to the fact that it rests 
on the strong assumption of aid generally being provided as fully fungible on-budget aid. Yet 
this is rather unrealistic, as a good portion of aid remains either entirely off-budget or is tied 
(earmarked) to the provision of specific public services or investment activities and therefore 
remains completely outside the recipient’s public financial management (PFM) system or, in 
the case of earmarked funding, outside the recipient’s direct allocational control (Adugna, 
2009). Thus, the modelling framework presented above can only be considered appropriate if 
applied to on-budget and fungible aid, as only those aid flows inform the recipient’s budget 
constraint in the way stipulated by Equation (1) and hence do indeed induce the possible fiscal 
responses discussed here.
13
                                                 
 
12   As aid comprises concessional borrowing, Bt refers to gross non-concessional domestic and foreign borrowing. 
  
13   As shown in Appendix II, the share of total ODA that does not fulfil this precondition is quite substantial. A conservative, 
lower bound estimate for the share of committed total ODA delivered tied and/or off-budget ranges from approximately 
30 to 50 percent to the SSA region for the period from 2000 to 2008. 10 
 
As  the present paper aims to detect the  sign and magnitude of the revenue mobilization 
response to the provision of new joint GBS, the modality of fungible on-budget aid provision 
par  excellence, the modelling framework  appears valid and appropriate  in this particular 
context.  
 
5.  Data 
To  undertake  a  meaningful  empirical  analysis  of the effect of joint GBS on recipients’ 
revenue mobilization efforts,  a concise and unambiguous definition of the particular aid 
modality  has to be applied. To  this end,  in  the following  paragraphs  three principal 
qualitative, definitional and data source specifications are made explicit.  
First, differences in the approach to joint provision of direct budget support, i.e. the degree of 
harmonization with respect  to the formulation of conditionality,  to  the assessment of 
recipients’ performance, and to disbursement decisions, have evolved over the last decade. To 
apply objective and unambiguous criteria for joint GBS operations, the present paper uses the 
definition provided by the World Bank (2010). According to this definition, recipients of joint 
General Budget Support are those where a common framework of conditionality (Policy 
Assessment Framework, PAF) or PAF-like framework are either being established or are 
partially or fully operational. According to the World Bank this is the case for Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
14
Second, as joint program features such as PAFs have evolved over time, we must address the 
question of how to correctly determine, in each particular case, the starting point for joint 
GBS interventions. As the preparation of government-owned PRSPs has been a universal and 
major precondition for budget support funding, the starting point for joint GBS has generally 
been the acknowledged acceptance of PRSPs by development partners. Hence, GBS 
disbursements to the above listed SSA countries, under evolving joint and harmonized policy 




Third, reliable aggregate disbursement data for joint GBS operations is hard to obtain, as the 
OECD/DAC CRS has reported bilateral as well as EU on-budget aid disbursals in a consistent 
manner only since 2004, while World Bank budget support lending operations have been 
continuously reported under varying categories.
  
16
                                                 
 
14   As noted by the World Bank (2010),  donor harmonization takes  different forms depending on the recipient aid 
architecture. Joint donor matrixes of policy actions, referred to as PAFs, are intended to “provide the basis for joint 
monitoring by all donors, for management according to a set of predefined common principles, however with 
disbursement still subject to individual donor decisions.” 
 In addition, CRS data on disbursals of the 
15   For data on PRSP approval, see the IMF’s web page: http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.aspx [accessed 12 June 
2011]. 
16   CRS General Budget Support purpose code is 51010. However, although entirely un-earmarked and fully on budget, 
IDA’s Poverty Reduction Support Credits are reported under varying sector codes. 11 
 
African Development Bank’s budget support operations seem somewhat inconsistent with 
data reported in the bank’s program reports and statistical compendia. To overcome these 
limitations, multilateral program data were gathered directly from the World Bank, the IMF 
and the African Development Bank program reports and databases. Bilateral and EU program 
data drawn from the OECD/DAC CRS have also been cross-checked for consistency with 
independent sources, such as cross-country evaluation reports on joint GBS financing, country 
assessment reports from various agencies, and recipients’ government budget statements.
17
The econometric baseline specification of the following econometric analysis controls for 
determinates of developing countries’ revenue mobilization capacity,  as  discussed  in the 
previous section  and identified as statistically and economically  significant  in  previous 
empirical research. Revenue mobilization efforts are proxied by central government revenue, 
excluding grants, as a share of GDP (REV). Explanatory variables comprise GBS as share in 
GDP  (GBS),  the share of agriculture in total value added (AGRIC), per capita income 
(GNIPC), the sum of imports and exports as share in GDP as a measure for trade openness 
(TRADE), and the stock of public and publically guaranteed debt as share in GDP (PPGD).
  
18 
As oil production has gained importance in SSA, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea, a dummy 
variable (OIL) has been included to control for windfalls from royalties and other extraction 
related revenue in oil producing countries.
19
The sample includes SSA LIC and LMICs that are eligible for funding under the World 
Bank’s concessional lending arm (IDA) and hence qualify as potential recipients of joint 
GBS.
  
20 The empirical analysis comprises the period from 2000, when the first PRSP-based 





6.  Methodology and Presentation of Results 
 
6.1  Methodology 
In the first step, the baseline specification, as outlined above, is estimated using a one error 
component fixed effects model (FE). The estimation equation is in the form of 
 
(5)  5 01 2 3 4 6 = + +++ ++ + it it it it it it it it REV GBS GNIPC AGRIC PPGD TRADE OIL u β β βββ ββ  
                                                 
 
17   A complete list of sources used is provided in Appendix III. 
18   Tanzi (1992) and subsequent studies drew on external debt stock data to proxy PPGD, as this data was not available at 
that point in time. In the meantime PPGD data has been made available through the World Bank’s Global Development 
Finance database, published online in September 2010 [accessed 12 June 2011].  
19   SSA sample countries with oil extracting industries comprise Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and 
Nigeria. Since 2000 the Dem. Rep. of Congo, Mauritania, Sudan, and Chad have taken up oil production. Start of oil 
production in Ghana in 2011 is not covered by the sample. 
20   IDA borrowing countries excluded from the sample due to data constraints are Cape Verde, Lesotho, Sierra Leone and 
Somalia. 
21   For a list of sample countries, detailed description of data sources and respective summary statistics, including correlation 
coefficients of explanatory variables, see Appendix I and III. 12 
 
with i and t indexing countries and time, respectively. The one-error component model is such 
that  
(6)  it i it uv µ = +. 
Hence, the error term consists of the country specific time invariant effect  i µ   and an 
individual time variant residual term  it v  (cp. Baltagi, 2009).
22
As error terms might be autocorrelated, it is advisable to test a dynamic model specification to 
control for robustness, with 
 To control for time specific 
effects and to avoid potential omitted variable biases caused by parsimonious specification, 
dummy variables have been included. 
(7)  1 , − + =+ ′ it it it it REV REV u αβ X  
where the  error term is given by  Equation  (6), and  it X representing  a  vector  of 
contemporaneous explanatory variables of Equation (5). As OLS produces biased and, hence, 
inconsistent estimators, the model specification is estimated using the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) framework (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
The differenced GMM in the form of 
(8)  1 − + ∆ = ∆ ∆ +∆ ′ it it it it REV REV v αβ X , 
eliminates country specific effects in the error term, which are correlated with REVit  and 
subsequently with REVit-1. Assuming that vit are serially uncorrelated, values of REV lagged 
two periods qualify as an instrument for the first differenced Equation (7). This implies the 
moment condition 
(9)  ( ) E 0 − ∆= it s it REV v    for t = 3, 4,..., T, and 2 1. ≤≤− st  
As revenue shares in GDP are highly persistent (Leuthold, 1991) with α approaching one, 
lagged levels of REV can be expected to be weak instruments for the differenced equation, 
which, as shown by Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000), can lead to finite sample biases. 
When augmenting the moment condition in Equation (9) by the level moment condition 
 
(10)  ( ) ( ) ,1 E 0 − + ∆ = i it it v REV µ    for t = 3, 4,..., T, 
differenced lagged dependent variables can, as shown by Blundell and Bond (1998), be used 
as valid instruments in the level Equation (7). In this case the differenced GMM estimator is 
augmented by the system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998), where Equation (7) and 
(8) are estimated simultaneously, drawing on moment conditions as expressed by Equation (9) 
and (10). 
                                                 
 
22   The Hausman specification test consistently rejects random effects in favor of the fixed effects model. 13 
 
If the explanatory variable xit, which is assumed to be correlated with the country specific 
effect  i µ , is endogenous in the sense that it is also correlated with contemporaneous or past 
shocks of the error term vit, two period lags or deeper can be applied as instruments for first-
differenced Equation (7), assuming that 
(11)  ( ) , E 0 − ∆ = i t s it xv    for t = 3, 4,..., T, and 2 1. ≤≤− st  
If, in addition to Eq. (10), it can be assumed that first-differenced explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated with the country specific time invariant effects, the following moment conditions 
are available:  
(12)  ( ) ( ) ,1 E 0 − + ∆ = i it it v x µ    for t = 3, 4,..., T. 
Consequently,  lagged first-differences of endogenous  explanatory  variables  are  suitable 
instruments for level Equation (7).  
For the specification outlined by Equation (5) and (7), such endogeneity problems could, as 
discussed by Gupta (2004) and Clist and Morrissey (2011), arise in two instances. First, joint 
GBS funding as share in GDP (GBS) could be endogenous if donors allocate GBS funds to 
those recipients with  satisfactory  PFM performance,  which are therefore  more likely to 
perform well in revenue mobilization. Such a selectivity bias can be caused by the significant 
fiduciary risks that are intrinsic to GBS financing, as donors’ means to control and influence 
the use of funds are very limited. Second, Public and Publically Guaranteed Debt as share in 
GDP (PPGD) might be endogenous, as shortfalls in revenue mobilization can, as specified in 
Equation (1), translate into higher borrowing by the public sector and, thus, a higher debt 
level. 
The system GMM estimator is obtained by imposing moment conditions for the dependent 
variable,  given by Equations  (9)  and  (10),  and moment conditions for endogenous 




6.2  Presentation and Discussion of Results 
Estimation results are presented in Table 3. Columns (I) and (III) are for FE and system GMM 
outputs of the baseline specifications outlined in Equations (5) and (7). Columns (II) and (IV) 
report results for FE and system GMM estimations, where the explanatory GBS variable has 
been  replaced by total ODA as share in GDP. The latter specification serves to  control 
whether results of previous studies on recipient’s revenue response to development assistance 
can be reproduced for the sample considered here (cp. Table 2). 
Dynamic estimation results report a high persistence for revenue as share in GDP with the 
lagged dependent variable’s coefficient close to 0.8. Accordingly, system GMM compared to 
                                                 
 
23   For system GMM estimation the STATA® Xtabond2 algorithm devised by Roodman (2006) has been used. 14 
 
differenced GMM has to be considered the preferred estimation method, as the latter, due to 
weak instruments,  tends  to produce inefficient  results  (Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer, 
2000). 
Table 3: Determinates of Revenue Efforts in SSA LIC and LMICs, 2000–2008 
Variable  FE Model 
I)  System GMM Model 
  (I)  (II)  (III)   (IV)  
Lagged CG Revenue  n.a.  n.a.  0.760 
(8.89) 
***  0.756 
(9.01) 
*** 
GNI per capita  0.005 
(2.56) 
**  0.005 
(2.50) 
**  0.002 
(3.59) 
***  0.002 
(3.46) 
*** 
GBS Disbursal   0.319 
(1.84) 
*     0.141 
(1.79) 
*    
ODA Disbursal     0.014 
(0.85) 
     0.012 
(0.83) 
 
PPGD  0. 022 
(1.55) 
  0.021 
(1.48) 
  0.007 
(2.33) 
  0.005 
(1.34) 
 
Agric. Value Added  -0.127 
(-1.73) 
*  -0.115 
(-1.55) 
  -0.035 
(-2.48) 
**  -0.038 
(-2.13) 
** 
Trade Openness  0.063 
(4.14) 
***  0.055 
(2.80) 
***  0.024 
(2.44) 
**  0.022 
(2.27) 
** 
Oil   2.456 
(1.35) 
  2.584 
(1.53) 
  2.148 
(2.70) 
**  2.134 
(2.50) 
** 
Constant  13.396 
(4.12) 
***  13.490 
(3.94) 
***  2.408 
(2.06) 
**  2.726 
(2.19) 
** 
Hansen Test  
(p-value) 
a) 
n.a.  n.a.  0.35    0.65  
Test for AR(1) in first 
differences (p-value)
 b) 
n.a.  n.a.  0.03    0.03  
Test for AR(2) in first 
differences P-value) 
b) 
n.a.  n.a.  0.48    0.50  
N  315    315    315    315   
No. of groups  37    37    37    37   
Max. no. per group  9    9    9    9   
Avg. no. per group  8.5    8.5    8.5    8.5   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 I) Robust standard errors (Huber/White robust variance estimates) are used.  Time invariant fixed effects 
capturing country specific factors such as institutional quality, colonial ties, and resulting government 
structures are jointly significant, as are time-specific effects controlling for external shocks. 
a) H0: instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
b) H0: the errors in the first-differenced equation exhibit no first- or second-order serial correlation. 
 
In accordance with system GMM moment conditions (9) and (10),  the first-differenced 
estimations  REVit  is instrumented using REVit-2,  plus ∆ REVit  for the level equation. All 
explanatory variables are treated as strictly exogenous. Specifications, where GBS or ODA 15 
 
and PPGD are treated as endogenous in the sense specified by Equation (11) and (12), yield 
similar results, albeit with increased statistical significance of GBS and PPGD, while total 
aid-over-GDP (ODA) remains economically and statistically insignificant.
24
By contrast, the system GMM baseline specification presented in Table 3, where GBS, ODA 
and PPGD are treated as exogenous, produces consistent results: The null-hypothesis of the 
Hansen test of over-identified restrictions, that instruments as a group are exogenous, cannot 
be rejected. In addition, the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order autocorrelation in 
first-differenced residuals suggests that augmented instruments can be considered 
uncorrelated with the error terms and thus do meet the moment conditions set out in the 
previous section: As the hypothesis of first order autocorrelation cannot be rejected while the 
hypothesis of second order autocorrelation can be reliably rejected, there are no warning signs 
of serial correlation detected in the level residuals.
  Introducing 
lagged differences for these variables leads, however, to an excessive number of instruments, 
which significantly exceeds the number of groups.  As shown by Roodman (2008), such 
instrument proliferation is likely to produce biased, and hence, misleading test statistics.  
25
Specifications (5) and (7) are  rather parsimonious.  Yet, as outlined in Section 3,  recent 
empirical research has not been able to detect additional robustly significant determinates for 
the revenue performance of developing countries. Meanwhile, the inclusion of other control 
variables, such as the share of industry or the share of services in total GDP, respectively, 
leads to a substantial increase in correlation among explanatories, producing multi-collinearity 
problems.  
  
FE and system GMM results confirm the significance of the structural determinates of 
revenue performance AGRIC, GNIPC and TRADE, identified by previous empirical research 
(cp. Table 2). When comparing the FE results  presented here  with those of Gupta et al. 
(2004), Teera and Hudson (2004), and Gupta et al. (2007), signs of coefficients, except for 
PPGD, are shown to be identical, and magnitudes fall in a similar range. The inclusion of a 
dummy variable for oil production seems highly advisable, as petroleum extraction appears, 
unsurprisingly, to be associated with a quite significant increase in revenue as share in GDP. 
PPGD is shown to have, in neither the static nor the dynamic specification, an economically 
strong or statistically significant effect on revenue mobilization. This suggests that the 
positive causal relation between the level of public debt and the level of domestic revenue 
detected in previous studies (cp. Tanzi, 1992; Teera and Hudson, 2004) has diminished, due 
to substantial debt cancellations under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) and the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).  
                                                 
 
24   Results are available from the author upon request. 
25   If residuals are serially uncorrelated, first-differenced residuals are, due to the time invariant country fixed effect, 
expected to follow a first order moving average process implying first-order autocorrelation. Second or higher order 
autocorrelation would, instead, hint towards autocorrelation in level residuals. 16 
 
As shown in Figure 1, PPGD ratios for HIPC eligible SSA countries, after unprecedentedly 
high levels in the 1980s and 1990s, declined strongly during the HIPC implementation period 




With public debt stocks in many SSA LICs cut to levels well below 50 percent of GDP, the 
desideratum for revenue fed interest and debt servicing has, evidently, declined accordingly.  




* Includes only countries that have reached HIPC completion point before 2009 and hence did also benefit from MDRI, 
which, for these countries, became effective in 2006 and 2007. 
  Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2011.  
 
Most importantly, however, joint GBS modalities, for which the fiscal response can, as shown 
in Section 4,  be appropriately modelled, appear to have a clear positive and statistically 
significant impact on revenue performance. This result holds true for both the FE and the 
system GMM specification, albeit  with lower economic significance  for the latter. 
Accordingly, joint GBS programs whose annual disbursements amount to around four percent 
of GDP (as is the case for Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, and 
Tanzania) are associated with a 0.70 percent (system GMM coefficient) increase in revenue as 
                                                 
 
26   The HIPC initiative, launched in 1996 by the IMF and the World Bank and expanded in 1999 (HIPC II), comprises 
substantive relief of multilateral, bilateral and commercial debt for 40 LICs who at the time of appraisal were eligible for 
IDA and SAF/PRSC/ECF funding and faced unsustainable debt burdens measured by debt-to-export and the debt-to-
government-revenues ratio. To reach completion (irrevocable cancellation of debt) countries must establish a good record 
of macroeconomic policy and reform with IMF and the World Bank, develop and implement a PRSP and allocate freed-
up budgetary resources to poverty reducing expenditure (see: IMF, 2011; IDA and IMF, 2010). The MDRI was launched 
in 2006 and comprises the cancelation of all multilateral debt disbursed before 2004 by AfDF, IADB, IDA and the IMF. 
Countries eligibility depends on the successful completion of the HIPC initiative (see: IDA and IMF, 2010). 
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a  share  in  GDP. This suggests that the identified  adverse effects from fully fungible aid 
provision on recipient’s revenue mobilization efforts can be counteracted by effective GBS 
program features – i.e., as outlined above, an institutionalized medium-to-long-term policy 
dialogue, fiscal policy conditionality, and PFM-related technical assistance components.  
The positive effect of GBS becomes even more pronounced when the dynamic specification is 
estimated for the time period from 2005 to 2008, a period in which joint GBS programs 
became well established and policy dialogue matured (see Table 1). For this sub-period, a 
joint GBS program amounting to around four percent of GDP relates to a 1.3 percent increase 
in revenue as share in GDP.
27
When controlling for the effect of total ODA on revenue mobilization efforts, instead of for 
the effect of joint GBS, the coefficient approaches  zero and  is  shown  to be statistically 
insignificant. This result is consistent with the underlying assumptions of Section 4: Due to its 
limited on-budget and fungibility characteristics – as shown in Appendix II, a substantial 
share of total aid is delivered tied or off-budget  –  ODA aggregates do not inform the 
recipient’s budget constraint in the way stipulated by Equation (1) and hence do not induce 
the potential fiscal responses discussed above. These results are in line with those of Gupta et 
al. (2004), Teera and Hudson (2004), and Gupta (2007) who find the share of total ODA in 
GDP  to be statistically and/or economically irrelevant in explaining recipients’ revenue 




7  Conclusion 
Drawing on the standard fiscal-response-modelling approach to fungible on-budget aid, first 
applied  by Heller (1975)  and  used  in subsequent research,  the present paper provides 
empirical evidence that new joint general budget support funding, although bearing unearned 
income characteristics and being fully subject to the recipient’s allocational control, does not 
negatively affect recipients’ revenue raising efforts. On the contrary, the results suggest that 
general budget support programs are associated with a measurable increase in domestic 
revenue mobilization. Such an effect cannot be detected when controlling for aggregate levels 
of aid, as significant shares in total ODA are not subject to the budgetary control of the 
recipient. In general, the findings presented above allow two principle policy conclusions to 
be drawn:  
First, it appears that there is no basis for anxieties that joint GBS funding, due to its windfall 
characteristics, negatively impacts developing countries’ domestic revenue generation efforts, 
thus increasing aid dependency. It seems that the risk of adverse fiscal policy incentives can 
be successfully mitigated by the following features of joint GBS operations in SSA countries:  
                                                 
 
27   System GMM estimation results for the 2005 to 2008 sub-period are presented in Appendix IV. The FE estimations are 
not further considered, as system GMM, due to the dynamic properties of the dependent variable and the rather small 
number of years, is more appropriate. 18 
 
i)  Program conditionality focuses primarily  on  public financial management in order to 
provide incentives for the measurable improvement of PFM and fiscal policy. According to 
the Budget Support Working Group of the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA BSWG), 
the most common areas of conditionality in SSA joint GBS programs are those related to 
PFM reform measures and macroeconomic performance (SPA BSWG, 2005, 2006).  
ii)  GBS serves not only as a disbursement vehicle under the institutionalized policy dialogue 
between recipients and development partners, but it is also used as a platform for providing 
substantive technical assistance with a strong focus on institution and capacity building, 
particularly in the area of PFM.  
iii)  By establishing harmonized conditions  for program assistance,  donors’ leverage and 
recipients’ incentive to perform, i.e. to fulfill conditionality, may have significantly increased 
(Knoll, 2008), all the more so as GBS funding substantially increases available budgetary 
resources. 
Second, while previous empirical studies have detected a statistically and economically weak 
overall effect of total aid, as well as a positive effect of loans and a negative effect of grants 
on recipients’ revenue performance, respectively, this paper suggests that these findings are 
blurred as they rest on the unrealistic assumption of aid generally being provided on-budget 
and untied. OECD/DAC disbursement data by type of aid averaged for the SSA region for the 
years from 2000 to 2008 suggests that aggregate aid disbursal is an imprecise measure for on-
budget aid provision as, at a conservative estimate, 30 to 50 percent of overall development 
assistance  remains  either tied or entirely off-budget  and is therefore  unlikely to  directly 
impact the revenue mobilization behavior of the recipient government. This, in turn, suggests 
that when fiscal response to aid is being considered, the appropriate analytical approach and 
the resulting predominant policy question should not be whether development assistance is 
provided in the form of grants or loans, but rather whether it should come under an on-budget 
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Appendix I: Country coverage and data sources 
1.  Data sources: 
Data  Description (taken from source):  Source: 
Domestic Revenue 
(% of GDP) 
Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, and other revenues such as fines, 
fees, rent, and income from property or sales. Grants are excluded. To obtain a balanced 
panel structure, missing values (approx. 70 percent) were filled drawing on IMF staff country 
reports (including article IV consultation reports, program reviews, statistical appendices and 
annexes, and recent economic developments reports) available from the Fund’s website (see 
table below). 
IMF Government 
Finance Statistics / 
Country Staff Reports  
Exports of Goods 
and Services (% of 
GDP 
Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services 
provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, 
transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, 
construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They 
exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) 
and transfer payments. 
World Bank, WDI, 
national accounts data 
Imports of Goods 
and Services (% of 
GDP 
Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services 
received from the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, 
insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, 
construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They 
exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) 
and transfer payments. 
World Bank, WDI, 
national accounts data 
External debt 
stocks, public and 
publicly guaranteed 
(PPGD)  
Public and publicly guaranteed debt comprises long-term external obligations of public 
debtors, including the national government, political subdivisions (or an agency of either), 
and autonomous public bodies, and external obligations of private debtors that are guaranteed 
for repayment by a public entity. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
World Bank, Global 
Development Finance 
GDP in current US$   GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from 
domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates. For a few countries where the 
official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange 
transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used. 
World Bank, national 
accounts data 
GNI per capita  Gross national income per capita is converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas 
method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident 
producers plus any product taxes not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of 
primary income from abroad. GNI, calculated in national currency, is usually converted to 
U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies, although an 
alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an 
exceptionally large margin from the rate actually applied in international transactions. To 
smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is 
used by the World Bank. 
World Bank national 




added (% of GDP) 
Agriculture includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and 
livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and 
subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added 
is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification, revision 3. 
As the share of agriculture value added in GDP shows to be rather persistent with a weak 
time trend (the within variance coefficient for the time period from 2000 to 2008 is 0.12), 
missing values (9 percent) have been filled applying linear interpolation. 
World Bank, 
National accounts data 
Industry value 
added (% of GDP) 
Industry comprises value added in mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, 
and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is 
determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification, revision 3. 
As the share of industry value added in GDP shows to be rather persistent with a weak time 
trend (the within variance coefficient for the time period from 2000 to 2008 is 0.17), missing 
values (9 percent) have been filled applying linear interpolation. 
World Bank, 
National accounts data 
ODA received (in 
% of GDP) 
ODA consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of 
principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the DAC, by multilateral 
institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in 
countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. It includes loans with a grant 
element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. World Bank GDP estimates are used as denominator. 
OECD/DAC 
GBS received (in % 
of GDP) 
GBS consists of disbursements of loans on concessional terms and grants provided under 
CRS Purpose Code 51010 by official members of the DAC (incl. EU), under IDA PRSC and 
IMF PRGF arrangements, and ADF concessional lending operations if they are undertaken 
within the framework of a partially or fully harmonized and aligned policy dialogue (in 
particular with regard to conditionality and performance assessment). According to the World 
Bank (2010) a common PAF or PAF-like framework is either being developed or already in 
place in the following SSA countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. GBS 
to Ethiopia has been  suspended  in 2005.  World Bank GDP estimates are used for the 
denominator. 
As listed below. 
2.  SSA countries included:  24 
 
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
3.  Sources used to fill missing values in the IMF GFS data base (revenue as share in GDP): 
No.  Country  IMF Source 
1  Angola  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 03/291, 05/228, 07/354, 10/302, and 11/51. 
2  Benin  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 02/158, and 10/195. 
3  Burkina Faso  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 02/3, 05/354, and 10/361. 
4  Burundi  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 02/242, 04/41, 05/322, 06/311, and 10/313. 
5  Cameroon  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 02/258, 05/413, 07/285, 08/279, and 10/259. 
6  Cape Verde  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 03/153, 04/304, 06/332, and 10/349. 
7  Central African Republic  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 04/159, 08/16, and 10/332. 
8  Chad  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 04/115, 05/74, 07/21, 07/28, 09/68, and 10/196. 
9  Congo, Dem. Rep.  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 01/123, 07/328, 10/88, and 11/54. 
10  Congo, Rep.  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 03/184, 09/74, and 11/67. 
11  Comoros  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 04/83, 04/259, 06/383, 09/307, and 11/72. 
12  Côte d’Ivoire  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 04/157, and 10/228. 
13  Equatorial Guinea  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 03/386, 06/233, 06/237, 08/156, 09/102, and 10/103. 
14  Eritrea  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 03/165, and 03/166. 
15  Ethiopia  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 02/214, 06/122, 09/34, and 10/339. 
16  Gabon  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 04/29, 05/3, 08/24, and 09/107. 
17  Gambia  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 04/143, 06/8, 08/324, 10/61, and 11/22. 
18  Ghana  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 03/133, 05/292, 09/256, and 10/178. 
19  Guinea  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 01/31, 02/66, 03/251, 05/222, 08/20, and 08/275. 
20  Guinea-Bissau  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 05/93, 07/370, 09/123, and 10/379. 
21  Kenya  IMF Country Staff Report No. 11/48. 
22  Liberia  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 02/148, 05/167, 07/356, 08/108/10/199, and 10/373. 
23  Madagascar  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 01/219, 03/7, 09/227, and 09/327. 
24  Malawi  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 02/182, 04/380, 06/445, 07/147, 08/26 and 10/87. 
25  Mali  IMF Country Staff Report No. 11/37. 
26  Mauritania  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 02/263, 03/314, 08/231, and 10/346. 
27  Mozambique  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 04/50, 05/318, 06/254, and 08/220. 
28  Niger  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 03/110, 05/79, 06/40, and 10/146. 
29  Nigeria  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 04/242, 07/20, and 11/57. 
30  Rwanda  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 03/192, 05/333, 07/233, and 11/19. 
31  Senegal  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 06/127, 06/274, 07/358, 08/209, and 10/362. 
32  Sudan  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 03/390, 06/182, 07/343, and 10/256. 
33  Tanzania  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 03/1, 03/238, 04/285, 06/138, 08/178, and 10/351. 
34  Togo  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 03/383 and 11/10. 
35  Uganda  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 03/84 and 10/132. 
36  Zambia  IMF Country Staff Reports No. 04/160 and 10/383. 




4.  Data sources for joint GBS disbursals to SSA recipients: 
Institution  Principal Sources  Means of verification*
) 
AfDB (African Development 
Fund) 
-  AfDB (2008): Statistical Compendium on Bank 
Group Operations. Volume XXXI. Table 3.08 
-  AfDB (2009): Statistical Compendium on Bank 
Group Operations. Volume XXXII. Table 3.08 
-  OCED/DAC CRS 
-  AfDB Country Programme 
Completion Reports 
-  Gerster (2007, 2008, 2009, and 
2010) 
-  IDD (2006) 
-  SPA-BSWG (2005, 2006, and 
2007) 
Bilaterals (incl. European 
Commission) 
- OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System, 
Purpose Code 51010. 
-  OECD/DAC CRS 
-  Gerster (2007, 2008, 2009, and 
2010) 
-  IDD (2006) 
-  SPA-BSWG (2005, 2006, and 
2007) 
IMF  - IMF online Transactions with the Fund 
database 
-  OECD/DAC CRS 
-  IMF Country Reports 
-  Gerster (2007, 2008, 2009, and 
2010) 
-  IDD (2006) 
-  SPA-BSWG (2005, 2006, and 
2007) 
World Bank (International 
Development Association) 
-  World Bank (2010) Poverty Reduction Support 
Credits: An Evaluation of World Bank Support. 
Independent Evaluation Group. October. 
Appendix Table A1.3 Poverty Reduction 
Support Credits By Country and Date (FY01-
08) 
-  World Bank online Projects and Operations 
database. 
-  OECD/DAC CRS 
-  Gerster (2007, 2008, 2009, and 
2010) 
-  IDA country program documents 
-  IDD (2006)  
-  SPA-BSWG (2005, 2006, and 
2007) 
*) Gerster, IDD, and Budget Support Working Group of the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA-BSWG) sources only 
cover disbursement data for selected years and/or for a sub-sample of recipients. 26 
 
 
Appendix II: Lower bound estimate for tied and/or off-budget aid commitments to SSA 
Using data from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS), a  lower bound proxy can be 
calculated from several types of aid that  are  provided either entirely off-budget or subject to 
earmarking:  
i)  Off budget funding comprises stand-alone  Technical Co-operation  (TC),  which is generally 
provided in kind by donor agencies for training, research, institutional capacity building, equipment, 
and administrative expenses (OECD/DAC, 2006; Adugna, 2009), and emergency assistance such as 
food aid, which is also directly managed by implementing agencies. Free-standing technical assistance 
refers to co-operation projects that are not embedded as components of other project or program 
activities. According to OECD/DAC (2006), the primary purpose of TC is to augment the level of 
knowledge, skills, technical know-how and productive aptitudes of people in aid recipient countries. 
Emergency and relief assistance is subsumed under CRS Purpose code 72010 (Material Relief and 
Assistance Services). 
ii)  The volume of aid provided under Project Investments (PI) can be used as a conservative, lower 
bound estimate for earmarked development assistance, as these funds are tied to specific sectors and 
expenditure items, i.e. investment. While PI funds clearly represent tied aid, they are also frequently 
kept off budget and are managed outside governments’ consolidated accounts and PFM systems. 
Earmarked revenue is tied to specific expenditure programs and hence is infungible to the extent that it 
bypasses the consolidated account (Buchanan, 1963). In development cooperation practice there are, 
however, different approaches to PI financing: a) PI funds can be transferred to the recipient’s treasury 
but kept and managed in special project accounts, using the governments or donors’ procurement and 
auditing procedures, b) PI funds can be kept in commercial accounts outside the recipient’s treasury 
and controlled either by the recipient government or donors, c) PI funds may be directly released by 
the donor agency to contracting partners upon request by the recipient government.  
 
Lower bound estimates for committed off-budget and earmarked aid to SSA 
 
Source: OECD/DAC CRS (2011). 
percent of total ODA committed to SSA 27 
 
Appendix III: Summary statistics 
 
Variable    Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  Observations 
Domestic revenue  overall  19.135  8.722  3.734  51.700  N =  315 
  between    8.192  9.424  43.800  n =  37 
  within    3.519  8.552  32.978  T =  8.514 
GNI per capita  overall  531.746  537.643  80.000  3340.000  N =  315 
  between    559.467  108.889  2770.000  n =   37 
  within    247.642  -414.921  2515.079  T =  8.514 
GBS disbursal (in % of 
GDP)  overall  0.908  1.642  0.000  8.020  N =  315 
  between    1.343  0.000  5.051  n =  37 
  within    0.947  -3.235  6.007  T =  8.514 
ODA received (in % of 
GDP)  overall  14.553  16.690  0.371  185.849  N =  315 
  between    12.072  0.414  61.088  n =  37 
  within    11.630  -36.982  139.313  T =  8.514 
Agriculture value added 
(% of GDP)  overall  31.121  14.689  3.432  75.523  N =  315 
  between    14.653  3.698  66.632  n =  37 
  within    3.634  17.143  47.801  T =  8.514 
Trade Openess  overall  71.472  35.790  19.350  219.179  N =      315 
  between    32.120  34.178  179.729  n =        37 
  within    15.043  14.461  186.181  T =   8.514 
Source: Own calculations. 
Correlation coefficients of explanatory variables 
 
  GBS  ODA  AGRIC  GNIPC  TRADE  PPGD 
GBS  1.000           
ODA  0.119  1.000         
AGRIC  0.055  0.345  1.000       
GNIPC  -0.134  -0.307  -0.621  1.000     
TRADE  -0.209  0.121  -0.432  0.390  1.000   




Appendix IV: System GMM estimation output for the 2005–2008 sub-period 
 
 
*   p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
*
)  In the first-differenced equation REVit is instrumented using REVit-2; 
plus ∆REVit for the level equation. Explanatory variables are treated 
as strictly exogenous.  
a)  H0: instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. The null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
b)  H0: the errors in the first-differenced equation exhibit no first- or 
second-order serial correlation. 
 
 
Variable  System GMM Model 
Lagged CG Revenue  0.424 
(2.30) 
**  0.477 
(2.65) 
** 
GNI per capita  0.004 
(3.12) 
***  0.004 
(2.91) 
*** 
GBS Disbursal   0.345 
(1.92) 
*    
ODA Disbursal     0.032 
(1.28) 
 
PPGD  0.013 
(1.46) 
  0.006 
(0.98) 
 
Agric. Value Added  -0.063 
(-1.59) 
  -0.079 
(-2.07) 
** 
Trade Openness  0.0484 
(2.44) 
***  0.032 
(1.88) 
* 
Oil   4.152 
(2.69) 
**  3.595 
(2.35) 
** 
Constant  5.380 
(1.96) 
*  6.333 
(2.54) 
** 
Hansen Test  
(p-value) 
a) 
0.21    0.28  
Test for AR(1) in first 
differences (p-value)
 b) 
0.04    0.03  
Test for AR(2) in first 
differences (P-value) 
b) 
0.35    0.36  
N  135    135   
No. of groups  36    36   
Max. no. per group  4    4   
Avg. no. per group  3.8    3.8   Diskussionsbeiträge  
des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft 
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